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If apocalypse is an event the script of which is already written, in what sense do human 
beings participate in apocalypse?1 
For some analysts, today’s representations of apocalypse are simply the latest version of a 
“pervasive sense of doom” which has characterized human civilization for millennia.2 For 
others, in the context of current environmental problems, a sense of impending disaster 
expresses a scientifically-supported assessment of today’s “risk society.” Giddens argues that 
“Doomsday is no longer a religious concept, a day of spiritual reckoning, but a possibility 
imminent in our society and economy.”3 Our argument is that the current fascination with the 
end of the world is best understood neither as a near-timeless feature of human culture nor as 
a reasoned response to objective environmental problems. Rather, it is driven by unconscious 
fantasy; the symbolic expression of an alienation from political subjectivity, characteristic of 
a historically specific period in the life of post-Cold War societies. With the script of the real 
apocalypse already written through scientific projections, how does environmental discourse 
and popular culture represent people? We will first consider recent critiques of the use of 
apocalypticism in environmental discourse; then examine elite uses of eco-apocalypse in 
political discourse; and finally discuss two films which envisage a world destroyed by 
catastrophic climate change: The Day After Tomorrow (USA, 2004) and The Age of Stupid 
(UK, 2009). 
 
Environmental Apocaphilia and its Critics 
Apocalyptic thinking is seen as useful by some environmentalists,4 but is also often 
viewed as problematic for various reasons. Sometimes it is rejected simply because it is 
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inaccurate, as in Lovelock’s acknowledgement that he was too alarmist about “Gaia’s 
revenge,”5 More often, what the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) think-tank 
describes as an “alarmist repertoire,” characterized by an “inflated or extreme lexicon,” an 
“urgent tone and cinematic codes,” and a “quasi-religious register of death and doom” is seen 
as ineffective or even counter-productive since it offers only a “counsel of despair.”6 This is 
not to say, of course, that apocalyptic constructions of climate change no longer feature 
prominently in public discourse: as the IPPR suggests, the “sensationalism and connection 
with the unreality of Hollywood films” which such apocalypticism involves may be “secretly 
thrilling;” a form of “climate porn.”7Unlike religious conceptions of apocalypse, the 
environmentalist version involves no moment of transcendence or redemption. Bruckner 
argues: 
 
The Christian Apocalypse presented itself as a revelation, a passage in to another 
temporal order, whereas this apocalypse reveals nothing, it issues the final judgment: 
pure apocalypse. No promise of redemption, just an ideal for survivors, an “epidemic 
of remorse.”8 
 
Similarly, contrasting the Judeo-Christian tradition with what he calls the “Hollywood-
informed formula” of eco-apocalypse, Mark Levene notes that the latter “provides an 
uncanny reflection of the workings of our ‘normative’ Western state and societal 
organization.” While some (scientific) elite may be cast as saviors, “the role available to the 
majority of humanity is nothing more than as passive onlookers.”9 The apocalypse ushers in 
non-democratic social transformation. 
In this sense, as Swyngedouw argues, environmentalism can be understood as post-
political, reinforcing “processes of depoliticization and the socio-political status quo.”10 
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Rather than offering any historic transformation or metaphysical salvation, environmental 
apocalypticism is “an expression of the current post-political and post-democratic condition,” 
in which “ideological or dissensual contestation and struggles are replaced by techno-
managerial planning, expert management and administration.”11 One might think of the way 
that international climate summits purport to decide “the future we want,”12 outside of any 
democratic debate about, or mechanism of accountability for that future, as confirming the 
accuracy of this account. An antipathy to what Swyngedouw calls “the properly political”13 is 
not an accidental or superficial aspect of contemporary environmentalism: in its insistence 
that the future human society must be guided by (the science of) climate change, it perforce 
closes off any space for democratic debate or disagreement. 
In characterizing environmentalism as a “new opium for the masses,” Swyngedouw 
draws on the work of Žižek and Badiou, both of whom make the same point.14 Yet a very 
similar argument was made more than thirty years previously by Baudrillard, who argued in 
1970 that environmentalism was “a new ‘opium of the people’.”15 Baudrillard put forward a 
traditionally Marxist ideology-critique, in which he compared environmentalism to a “witch-
hunt,” in that it attempted to unite antagonistic social classes in a “new crusade” against a 
mystified threat by “shouting apocalypse.” “Nothing better than a touch of ecology and 
catastrophe to unite the social classes,” he remarked caustically. It is a powerful critique – 
perhaps even more compelling than more recent iterations of the argument. Yet it no longer 
seems accurate to think of visions of eco-apocalypse as papering over political divisions 
which threaten to burst though at any moment; nor to think of this as an elite strategy to 
silence dissent and suppress demands for social change (as sometimes implied by 
Swyngedouw and Žižek). 
Whereas Baudrillard was probably correct, in 1970, to argue that environmentalism 
was a “therapeutic mythology” which masked real “social contradictions,” we claim that 
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today environmentalism draws on an individuated, therapeutic ethos to provide a “solution” 
for the loss of modernist political agency. Since the end of the Cold War Western societies 
have increasingly made use of therapeutically derived understandings of the self to 
understand and communicate with each other,16 giving expression to Bruckner’s “epidemic of 
remorse.” For example, the psycho-social scholar Paul Hoggett identifies redemptive and 
survivalist variants to apocalyptic narrative, which he claims are different manic attempts for 
fending off despair, manifested in the split and simplified polarization of the two opposing 
sides in the environmentalist debate.17 In making this argument we seek to highlight the 
profound changes which are entailed in the collapse of modernist Left/Right politics at the 
end of the 1980s.18 In particular, the absence of this long-established political framework has 
led to the future being viewed with uncertainty and fear, since there is no readily available 
structure of meaning through which to make sense of change. It provides fertile ground for a 
discourse of fear19 or risk consciousness.20 Shaped by this discourse environmentalism 
provides a potential magical “solution” to the problem of cohering a constituency in the 
present for elite and other political actors, by therapeutically speaking on behalf of future 
generations and non-human nature as being at risk from catastrophic harm. In these 
circumstances, it is not so much that an ideology holds back some latent movement for 
collective social change, but rather that we are deeply alienated from our own political 
agency, the sphere of action limited to intra and inter-personal relations and survival. 
As a response, eco-apocalypse offers a sense of purpose or mission in the absence of 
political visions of the future; and secondly, provides a fetish for the loss of modernist 
political subjectivity. The following sections elaborate each of these claims with an 
illustration of how mainstream political leaders have attempted to use the scientific projection 
of environmental catastrophe; and secondly with a discussion of apocalyptic cinematic 
narratives which use therapeutic discourse. 
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Post-Political Green Meaning 
The official film made to publicize the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen provides a telling illustration of the way that elites view themselves in relation to 
the issue of climate change.21 Produced by the Danish Foreign Ministry and screened at the 
opening of the summit, the video depicts a nightmare scenario of environmental apocalypse: 
it features a young girl having a bad dream about the cataclysmic destruction of an apparently 
depopulated earth in a rapid series of natural disasters – drought and desertification, 
earthquake, tornado and flooding. Her nightmare is induced by watching television news 
stories about the impacts of climate change before she goes to bed. After she wakes up 
screaming in terror, she relates the dream to her father, who comforts her by going online and 
showing her the official Copenhagen Summit website, which offers reassurance that 
international leaders are aware of the problem. Inspired by the site, the girl borrows her 
father’s camcorder and runs up to the roof of their apartment building, where she films 
herself saying “please help the world.” The phrase, which is also the title of the film, is then 
reiterated by other children from around the world, their successive images zooming away to 
form the summit’s globe logo, accompanied by the slogan “We have the power to save the 
world. Now.” The video provides a striking insight into the official mind-set: what appears, at 
first glance, to be a campaigning film about people putting pressure on world leaders is really 
an elite wish-fulfillment fantasy, in which child-citizens across the globe put their faith in 
parent-politicians engaged in an heroic, planet-saving mission. While activists are apt to think 
of themselves as taking a principled stand and putting pressure on compromised politicians, 
leaders actually seem delighted by the authority such “pressure” bestows on them. If public 
pressure is not forthcoming, they go out of their way to encourage and, if necessary, to 
simulate it through popular culture and the medium of film. 
Political elites have seized upon climate change as an issue around which they can 
create the appearance of purposeful activity and meaningfulness. In the months before the 
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Copenhagen summit the British government attempted to re-present itself as some sort of 
activist organization, launching the “Act on Copenhagen” campaign which urged: “Pledge 
your support for an ambitious global deal here!” because “We need your backing to help us 
negotiate.”22 Behaving as if it were its own pressure group, the government urged the public 
to urge them to act. At the same time, it also berated its citizens for their apathy. Worrying 
that “there isn’t yet that feeling of urgency and drive and animation about the Copenhagen 
conference,” for example, Miliband complained that, “the penny hasn’t dropped that this 
climate change challenge is real and is happening now.”23 Miliband was speaking at the 
launch in October 2009 of the Science Museum’s “Prove it!” exhibition – another ersatz 
“campaign,” this time inviting people to sign up to the statement: “I want the government to 
prove they’re serious about climate change by negotiating a strong, effective, fair deal at 
Copenhagen.” Yet according to the museum’s director, the exhibition was created in direct 
response to a briefing from the government’s Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
when “we realized that public interest had flattened out and yet here we were approaching the 
most historic negotiations in human history.”24 In other words, it was official concern about a 
lack of public interest which produced a campaign in which the public would be encouraged 
to put pressure on officials. 
Such is the relationship between the elite and the electorate today: they urge us to be 
less apathetic and to urge them to act. The reason for this strange simulation of a political 
relationship is that environmental activism provides a vocabulary through which leaders can 
articulate a sense of purpose and meaning which is otherwise signally absent from today’s 
narrow and trivial political discourse. President Barack Obama, for example, claimed to have 
“renewed American leadership” at Copenhagen. Hailing the accord that he negotiated as a 
“meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough,” he said that the summit marked “the 
beginning of a new era of international action.”25 In advance of the summit, the language was 
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even more grandiose, as leaders imagined how they would “change the course of history” by 
negotiating a reduction in carbon emissions.26 It seems unlikely that, in the long run, the 
elite’s search for meaning in green politics will be successful. The vision it offers – of urgent 
regulation – is a largely negative, dystopian one, characteristic of a demoralized society, for 
which, as one climate campaigner puts it, “the age of heroism is over.”27 While the elite may 
continue to campaign and cajole the public about the climate, they do so precisely because of 
their inability to engage people in a non-apocalyptic, forward-looking project. 
The Cinematic Eco-Apocalypse 
Yet if the narrative of eco-apocalypse seems limited as a directly political resource, its 
continuing cinematic reiteration suggests that it has considerable popular cultural resonance. 
Indeed, we would suggest that cinematic eco-apocalypse is appealing to the contemporary 
imagination partly because it is anti-political, allowing the frustrations and difficulties of 
political engagement to be swept aside. More precisely, in both The Day After Tomorrow and 
The Age of Stupid, we identify three themes: firstly, the sphere of conventional, formal 
politics is rejected as dysfunctional and/or negative; secondly, large-scale transformative 
agency is disavowed and instead projected into nature; and thirdly, as a consequence, human 
“agency” is reduced to individualized, small-scale actions which are therapeutic in character. 
One of the basic insights of modern left-wing politics was that the problems facing 
humanity were social rather than natural in origin, and that they could therefore potentially be 
resolved through collective social action. With large-scale social change off the political 
agenda in Western societies for the time being, it is much harder to hold on to the insight that 
our problems are social in origin and solution. Political agency is now very narrowly 
associated with governments and disconnected politicians, who are represented negatively in 
both films. The Age of Stupid offers reductive caricatures of politics and economics, for 
example in a short animated sequence which presents the history of modernity as a series of 
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failed “-isms” ending with “consumerism.” Political agency is also represented in the 
attempts of one individual to gain permission from his local council to build a wind farm. His 
anger and frustration with the political system is clear when his proposal is rejected through 
the actions of an organized group of “NIMBY” (not in my back yard) residents. 
In The Day After Tomorrow a negative portrayal of formal political agency is 
embodied in the dismissive and belligerent Vice-President Becker (a character clearly 
modeled on the unpopular Dick Cheney). The Vice-President refuses to listen to the scientific 
evidence presented by the film’s hero until it is too late to act. Catastrophic weather events 
destroy not only the physical human environment, but also the prevailing social order: 
survivors of the US administration take refuge in Mexico. By the end of the film, a humbled 
and penitent Vice-President is forced to admit that he was wrong and, by extension, that the 
whole social order he represents was flawed, mistakenly believing it could use nature’s 
resources without consequences.  
In both The Day After Tomorrow and The Age of Stupid, then, there is a clear sense 
that the destruction is deserved, as a kind of punishment for past sins or stupidities. As 
Walliss and Aston observe, this is characteristic of the kind of “social commentary” found in 
several apocalyptic films – other examples include Children of Men (2006), The Day the 
Earth Stood Still (2008) and Knowing (2009) – whereby the existing socio-political order is 
simply wiped out to allow a fresh start, and any hope for the future is vested in the innocence 
of childhood as against the corrupt adult world.28 Alienated from a political agency 
characterised as wholly negative, subjectivity is projected into nature, so that the climate 
(spectacularly represented in line with the worst-case scenario scientific projection), rather 
than collective humanity, becomes the active agent of change. Something similar might be 
said of environmentalist politics, which suffers from “climate reductionism,” whereby we 
give up the future to natural forces rather than understanding it as something which is 
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potentially within human control: [Climate reductionism] is nurtured by elements of a 
Western cultural pessimism which promote the pathologies of vulnerability, fatalism and 
fear….By handing the future over to inexorable non-human powers, climate reductionism 
offers a rationalization, even if a poor one, of the West’s loss of confidence in the future.29 
Projecting social agency into nature not only re-presents human agency in an alienated and so 
diminished form, it is also politically counter-productive, because natural change is 
represented (through the use of C.G.I. and camera angles) on a vastly larger scale than 
historical, human actions; a scale that cannot, currently, be matched. Agency becomes an 
uncontrollable, destructive capacity; while humanity, alienated from institutional political 
agency, is reduced to a passive, at-risk, victim subjectivity. 
Rather than simply an absence of redemption or salvation, it would be more accurate 
to say that environmental apocalyptic narratives offer a kind of “pseudo redemption”: there is 
a sense of individuated, small-scale, therapeutic redemption, to be achieved through 
reparative actions in response to loss, as individuals react to the power of nature. For 
example, the climate-scientist protagonist in The Day After Tomorrow, having failed in his 
attempts to persuade the authorities of the impending crisis, instead wages a different 
struggle. Battling against the elements, he goes on a quest to rescue his estranged teenage 
son, who is stranded with a small band of survivors in New York. While massive forces of 
natural destruction effect large-scale social transformation, human action is confined to 
mending broken inter-personal relationships. Similarly, in the semi-documentary film The 
Age of Stupid the focus is on the real-life characters’ disclosure of a range of events, directly 
or indirectly attributable to climate change, which have caused personal loss, pain and 
suffering. The audience is first shown the imagined effects of apocalyptic climate change on 
iconic tourist sites that represent human civilization, and selected news footage shows the 
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destruction caused by adverse weather conditions. This provides the context for a 
personalized exploration into human loss. 
It might be assumed that this focus on the inter-personal derives from genre 
conventions–the need for human-interest drama in a Hollywood disaster-movie like The Day 
After Tomorrow; and for compelling personal stories in a hybrid drama-documentary such as 
The Age of Stupid. Yet, interestingly, the same therapeutic framework can be found in Al 
Gore’s campaigning documentary An Inconvenient Truth (2006), suggesting that this focus 
on personal relationships, losses and regrets may have a deeper connection with 
environmentalist discourse. As Gore intersperses his scientific exposition with childhood 
reminiscences, stories of past personal setbacks, and emotive accounts of the loss of his sister 
and the near-death of his son, it becomes clear that the form of change that is called for is a 
moral and personal one. In all three films, protagonists draw on emotionally difficult personal 
experiences as an interpretive framework for changing their behavior. In so far as there is a 
“revelation” (the original, Greek meaning of “apocalypse”), it derives from self-reflection 
and remembrance of past losses; and in so far as people exercise agency, it is understood as 
reparative, making good the painful experiences of the past. This therapeutic rendering of the 
apocalypse reaches its zenith with the “psycho-apocalypse” films of 2011 (such as 
Melancholia) where no survivors remain and the apocalypse is desired as a release from a 
troubling world.30 The therapeutic rendering of apocalypse gives rise to a sublime fascination 
with psychological suffering with environmental destruction as its context. Through this the 
frustrations of societal relatedness and political engagement are negated or revenged.  
Therapeutic Apocalypticism 
As Swyngedouw and we argue, visions of eco-apocalypse are both symptomatic of, and also 
reinforce, a “post-political” outlook, in which the urgency of impending climate catastrophe 
closes down democratic debate about possible futures. Although elites may sometimes invoke 
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the threat of eco-apocalypse as offering a meaningful framework for political engagement, 
this does not so far appear to have been very effective. Instead, as we have argued, the result 
is a kind of pseudo-politics, a simulated form of activism through film in which 
unenthusiastic citizens are harangued by political leaders attempting to establish some point 
of connection with the public. Cinematic versions of eco-apocalypticism perhaps help to 
explain why it seems to be of limited use as a political resource for elites. Although such 
films often have a more or less overt campaigning tone and intent, they also tend to be 
dismissive of current political processes and institutions, and it may be that part of their 
popular appeal lies precisely in their anti-political outlook. If audiences enjoy imagining the 
current socio-political order being cut down or even entirely obliterated, this seems to speak 
to a fundamentally anti-political sentiment rather than offering any basis for renewed political 
engagement. 
Ultimately, though, it is not the apocalyptic event itself that is most salient about these 
films but how human experience and agency are now formulated in relation to it, through a 
therapeutic ethos. These apocalyptic narratives represent an ethically compelling response, by 
drawing on therapeutic culture to represent subjectivity which is reduced to a therapeutic 
consideration of how people should conduct themselves in relation to the environment and 
their loved ones. In the eco-therapeutic apocalypse nature is malevolent, coming back at us in 
a paranoid31 and alienated form; compelling a process of psychological change. . Knowing 
that the apocalypse is imminent generates a fear of loss, producing guilt and regret about 
one’s personal actions, which becomes the driving force for reparative actions.  
Therapeutic-apocalyptic narratives symbolize an alienated relationship to history: 
there are no political choices in intra- and interpersonal relationships, only emotional and 
ethical ones. This is why we argue that eco-therapeutic apocalyptic narratives give indirect 
expression to the loss of modernist political subjectivity. If we are to overcome our current 
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failure of historical imagination, it does us little good to assume that ready-made political 
constituencies are waiting in the wings, held back by a depoliticizing environmentalism. 
Rather, we will need to address directly the failure of modernist politics and confront the 
disavowal of recent socio-economic and political experience. Doing so may enable us better 
to understand the state of contemporary politics and entertainment media culture, and to 
create a space for imagining non-apocalyptic, human futures. 
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